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Abstract 
 
Becker's theory of human capital predicts that minimum wages should reduce training 
investments for affected workers because they prevent these workers from taking wage cuts 
necessary to finance training.  In contrast, in noncompetitive labor markets, minimum wages 
tend to increase training of affected workers because they induce firms to train their unskilled 
employees.  We provide new estimates on the impact of the state and federal increases in the 
minimum wage in the US between 1987 and 1992 on the training of low-wage workers.  We 
find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training, and little evidence that they tend to 
increase training.  We therefore develop a hybrid model where minimum wages reduce the 
training investments of workers who were taking wage cuts to finance their training, while 
increasing the training of other workers.  Finally, we provide some evidence consistent with 
this hybrid model. 
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1 Introduction
Much of the recent debate on the minimum wage has focused on its employment impli-
cations. The theory of human capital suggests that minimum wages should also have
important adverse eﬀects on human capital accumulation. In the standard human capi-
tal theory, as developed by Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967), and Mincer (1974), a large
part of human capital is accumulated on the job, and workers often finance these invest-
ments through lower wages. A binding minimum wage will therefore reduce workplace
training, as it prevents low wage workers from accepting the necessary wage cuts (Rosen,
1972). The early empirical literature has confirmed this prediction. The negative impact
on human capital formation has been an important argument against minimum wages
in the minds of many economists and policy-makers, and an important piece of evidence
in support of the standard theory of human capital.
In this paper, we revisit the impact of minimum wages on training. We build on our
previous work, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), which showed that a compression in the
structure of wages can induce firm-sponsored training. We show that in noncompetitive
labor markets minimum wages can increase–rather than decrease–training investments
because they compress the wage structure.
The intuition for this result is that minimum wages make it less profitable to em-
ploy unskilled workers. When there are no rents in the employment relationship, as
in a competitive labor market, the firm has no option but to lay oﬀ workers who were
previously paid below the new minimum wage. In contrast, in the presence of labor
market rents, it may be more profitable to increase the productivity of workers, who
are already receiving high wages, rather than laying them oﬀ. Figure 1 illustrates this
intuition diagrammatically. It draws the relation between worker skills, τ , productivity,
f(τ), and wages w(τ). The gap between productivity and wages, ∆, is the rent that the
firm obtains. A binding minimum wage, in the absence of such rents, forces the firm to
lay oﬀ the worker. However, with ∆ suﬃciently high, the firm would like to retain the
worker despite the higher wages dictated by the minimum wage. In this case, the firm
would also like to increase the productivity of the worker. Without the minimum wage,
the gap between f(τ) and w(τ) was constant, so there was no point in incurring costs
of training. However, with a minimum wage, profits are less at τ = 0 than at τ = 1. So
if the firm can increase its employee’s skills to τ = 1 at a moderate cost, it will prefer to
do so. In essence, the minimum wage has made the firm the de facto residual claimant
of the increase in the worker’s productivity, whereas without the minimum wage, the
worker was the residual claimant.
This reasoning suggests that a binding minimum wage may induce firms to invest
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Figure 1: Training with a Minimum Wage and Employment Rents
more in the skills of their employees. Since this implication diﬀers sharply from the
prediction of the standard theory, empirical evidence on this point can shed light on
whether non-competitive features aﬀecting training decisions are important. Although
existing evidence points to a negative eﬀect of minimum wages on training, we argue
that this evidence suﬀers from a number of problems. We therefore adopt a diﬀerent
approach and provide new empirical estimates that are quite diﬀerent from those in the
literature. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the period
1987 to 1992. This period encompasses a number of state minimum wage increases
as well as two federal increases in the minimum in 1990 and 1991. Our data therefore
contain a large amount of within state variation in minimum wages. Furthermore, the
NLSY is a panel of youths and oversamples those from disadvantaged backgrounds, so
it contains a relatively high number of low wage workers directly aﬀected by minimum
wage increases.
Our empirical results show almost no evidence of a reduction in training in response
to minimum wages. But, they also do not provide strong support for our alternative
model. Overall, the evidence suggests that minimum wages appear to have little eﬀect on
training investments for low-wage workers. Although we cannot rule out modest positive
or negative eﬀects, our two standard error confidence bands exclude large negative eﬀects
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of minimum wage increases on training–in fact, most of our most reliable estimates are
positive.
An appealing way to explain the empirical findings is a hybrid model in which min-
imum wages increase training for some workers while reducing it for others. In this
model, as in the standard theory, the wages of some workers are low because they are
compensating their employers for investments in general skills. The minimum wage laws
prevent this. This approach therefore suggests that minimum wages reduce the training
of workers taking wage cuts to finance their training, while inducing further training
for those who were constrained in their human capital investments. This hybrid model
predicts that the impact of minimum wages should depend on the presence and size of
labor market rents. We end the paper with some evidence pointing in this direction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the pre-
vious empirical literature. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical setup where, contrary
to the predictions of the standard theory, minimum wages increase training investments.
In Section 4, we describe our data set, and discuss the empirical strategy to estimate
the eﬀects of minimum wages on training. Our results are presented in Section 5. Since
the empirical evidence supports neither the standard Becker theory nor our model, in
Section 6, we consider a hybrid model where minimum wages increase training for some
workers, while reducing it for others. In Section 7, we provide some additional empirical
evidence on this hybrid model. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Critique of the Previous Empirical Literature
There is a small empirical literature investigating the impact of minimum wages on
training. Part of this literature focuses on whether minimum wage laws lead to slower
observed wage growth in micro data. Both Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto
(1982) have found this to be the case and concluded that minimum wage laws lead to
less training. But, since a minimum wage increases the wages of low paid workers, it can
reduce wage growth without aﬀecting training. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to interpret
the decline in age-earnings profiles as evidence of reduced investment in general training.
Consistent with this view, Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) find no eﬀect of minimum wages
on training, but still find lower wage growth for minimum wage workers. Furthermore,
Card and Krueger (1995) compared cross sectional wage profiles in California before
and after the 1988 minimum wage increase with a number of comparison states. They
also found flatter profiles in California after the minimum wage increase. However, they
point out that the Californian profile also shifts up and does not cross the previous
age-wage profile. This pattern contradicts the standard theory, but is consistent with
3
the predictions of our model.
Given the diﬃculty of interpreting changes in the slope of wage profiles, we find it
more compelling to look at the impact of minimum wages on training directly, but we are
only aware of four previous studies doing this for the US. Leighton and Mincer (1981) use
worker reported data on the receipt of training from the Panel Study of Income Dynamic
(PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey and find that workers in states with lower
wages and therefore a more binding federal minimum wage receive significantly less
training. Cross state comparisons may be confounded by the presence of other state
eﬀects, however. For example, industrial and occupational composition of employment
varies substantially across states, and diﬀerent industries and occupations have diﬀerent
skill requirements. These considerations suggest that across state comparisons are hard
to interpret.
Schiller (1994) reports a similar finding using later data from the NLSY by compar-
ing the training incidence of minimum wage workers with those earning higher wages.
The evidence from this study is even harder to interpret because worker traits which
lead to higher pay are typically also associated with more training. Grossberg and Si-
cilian (1999) use data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) and
compare minimum wage workers both to workers earning slightly less and slightly more,
ameliorating the problem of worker heterogeneity somewhat. They find insignificant
negative eﬀects on training for male minimum wage workers and insignificant positive
eﬀects for women. Leighton and Mincer only analyzed men, although women make up
the majority of minimum wage workers.
Some of these problems are overcome in a more recent study by Neumark and
Wascher (1998), who use Current Population Survey (CPS) supplements to compare
the impact of minimum wages on training within states using comparisons of young
workers in 1991 with older workers (who are less likely to be aﬀected by the minimum
wage) and with young workers in 1983. These comparisons assume that state diﬀer-
ences in training levels are the same for younger and older workers and remain so over
long time periods, which are stringent requirements. They also find negative eﬀects of
minimum wages on training, but these eﬀects seem to be too large to be sensible.
To see why the eﬀects implied Neumark and Washer’s paper are implausibly large,
note that their treatment group consists of all young workers. Not all of these workers
are aﬀected by the minimum wage, however. Let us assume, quite generously, that all
workers earning less than 160 percent of the minimum are “aﬀected” by the minimum
wage. The 160 percent of the average federal minimum over the period they study
is $5.60, and 40 percent of workers aged 20-24 are paid below this wage in 1991.
Neumark and Washer’s estimates imply that formal training among workers aged 20-24
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in California (a high minimum wage state) was 3.2 percentage points lower than in states
which were subject to the lower federal minimum. This point estimate, then, implies
that among aﬀected workers, training will be lower by approximately 8 percentage points
(i.e. 3.2 percentage points divided by 0.40). The average incidence of training among
aﬀected workers in low minimum wage states is 3.0 percent (much lower than among all
workers aged 20-24 for whom the incidence is 10 percent). So this estimate implies that
introducing California’s minimum wage to low minimum wage states should have wiped
out all training two and a half times among aﬀected workers in these states! Clearly, an
implausibly large eﬀect.1
3 Minimum Wages and Training In Noncompetitive
Labor Markets
In this section, we use a two-period model to analyze the impact of minimum wages
on training. The main result of this analysis is that plausible deviations from perfectly
competitive labor markets, which introduce firm-specific rents and prevent workers from
financing their own training, change the conclusions of Becker’s theory. Namely, we find
that minimum wages can increase investments in general training.
3.1 Environment
The world lasts for two periods, 1 and 2. There is no discounting, and all agents are risk-
neutral. There is a continuum of workers with mass 1, who supply labor inelastically.
These workers diﬀer by ability. More specifically, there is a distribution of abilities across
workers denoted by G(η) with support
h
η, η
i
. We introduce heterogeneity in abilities
to capture the disemployment eﬀects of the minimum wage. This feature will also be
useful later in Section 6 when we discuss the possibility of workers paying for their own
training.
We view period 1 as the early career of workers. A worker with ability ηi produces θηi
in the first period, where θ < 1. In the second period, he produces ηi. In addition, during
the first period, he can be trained. To simplify the discussion we assume that training is
indivisible, so only τ = 0 (no training) and τ = 1 (training) are possible. A worker who is
trained produces ηi + φ in the second period where φ > 0. Additive returns to training
simplify the expressions, without aﬀecting the results; moreover, they highlight that
firm-sponsored training does not arise because of a complementarity between training
1In response to this criticism, Neumark and Washer now argue that workers earning above 160
percent of the minimum are also aﬀected by the minimum wage.
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and ability (a possibility demonstrated in Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b).
We assume that training is general, so this increase in productivity applies equally
in all firms. The cost of training, which is independent of ability, is incurred in terms of
lower output in the first period and is equal to c > 0. In order to draw a stark contrast
to the Becker model, we assume that all training investments have to be financed by
the firm. This could be because training is non-contractible, so the firm can renege
on its training promise even if the worker takes a wage cut to finance his training (see
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, for a discussion).
We assume:
Assumption 1: φ > c,
which implies that training is productive.
There is free-entry at zero cost and all firms have access to the same technology. We
also assume that the firm obtains an additional revenue δ, if the worker was employed
in the first period with this firm. Therefore, δ is a firm-specific productivity increase,
and it is the only deviation from competitive labor markets we introduce.
The presence of the term δ creates a match-specific surplus to be divided between
the firm and the worker. We assume Bertrand competition among firms (or equivalently,
firms make take it or leave it oﬀers to workers). Since the second-best opportunity of
workers does not include δ, initial employers capture the whole amount δ, only paying the
“market wage”, even though workers’ productivity is higher than this. As will become
apparent shortly, the presence of rents from the employment relationship is crucial, but
the results would be unaﬀected if the worker captures a fraction β < 1 of this surplus.
Observe also that this mobility cost implies that all workers will stay with their initial
employer.2
3.2 Equilibrium Without Minimum Wages
Equilibrium can now be characterized by backward induction. In the second period,
each firm is willing to pay up to η for an untrained worker of ability η employed by
another firm, and is willing to pay η + φ for a trained worker. Bertrand competition
then ensures that
w2(ηi, NT ) = ηi, (1)
2Alternatively, we could have that a worker who changes jobs in the second period incurs a mobility
cost δ, because he has to acquire some costly skills, specific to the new employer, before becoming
productive. All our results continue to hold with this alternative interpretation. Also, in practice,
workers earning close to the minimum wage have high mobility. Our results continue to hold if a
fraction s < 1 of workers change jobs.
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w2(ηi, T ) = ηi + φ.
Using the fact that in equilibrium all workers stay with their first period employer,3
the profits of a representative firm from a worker of ability ηi, as a function of its training
strategy, NT or T , can be written as:
Π(ηi, NT ) = (θηi − w1 (ηi)) + (ηi + δ − w2(ηi, NT )) (2)
Π(ηi, T ) = (θηi − c− w1 (ηi)) + (ηi + δ + φ− w2(ηi, T )),
where w1 (ηi) is the first period wage of a worker with ability ηi. The first bracket in
each expression therefore gives first period profits, while the second is profits in period 2.
Substituting (1) into (2), we immediately see that Π(η, T )−Π(η, NT ) = −c, irrespective
of the value of η. That is, if it trains its employees, the firm simply loses the training
cost. The reason is simple: a trained worker receives φ more in the second period, and
this is exactly the increase in his contribution to the firm’s output. So the worker is
the full residual claimant of the increase in productivity due to training, and the second
period profit of the firm is equal to δ, independent of whether the worker is trained.
Since the training cost c has to be paid by the firm, it is not optimal for any firm to
invest in its employee’s skills. Although there are firm-specific rents, because they do
not interact with training–in particular, they do not induce compression in the wage
structure (see Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b)–, firms have no incentive to train, even
though training is socially desirable.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we have to determine first period
wages. Firms have to make zero profits from all workers, and there is no training, so
Π(ηi, NT ) = 0 for all ηi. This gives:
w1 (ηi) = θηi + δ (3)
A noteworthy feature is that compensation can be front-loaded or back-loaded. Front-
loading arises because firms anticipate δ, the rent they will receive in the second period,
and are willing to bid higher than the worker’s current productivity.4
We can summarize this analysis (proof in the text):
3Even though workers do not receive any of the firm-specific rents, there is no labor mobility in
equilibrium. Suppose this were not so, then the firm could oﬀer ε more than the market wage and
convince the worker to stay, so mobility cannot be part of an equilibrium.
4In the case where the firm-specific rent δ is shared between the firm and the worker, there will be a
further force towards an upward sloping wage profile. For example, if the worker receives a fraction β
of this rent, the second period wage of an untrained worker will be ηi + βδ, while his first period wage
will be θηi + (1− β) δ. As β increases, the age-earnings profile becomes steeper.
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Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium in which there is no training, all workers
are employed, and receive the first period wage given by (3) and the second period wage
w2(NT ) given by (1).
So despite Assumption 1, which ensures that training is socially beneficial, there is no
training in equilibrium. This is in line with Becker’s standard theory; firms are unwilling
to invest in the general skill of their employees as they do not receive any of the benefits
of training, and here workers are assumed unable to “buy” training. However, there is
full employment in this decentralized economy, in particular, the level of employment is
equal to the labor force, 1.
3.3 The Impact of Minimum Wages on Training
Now consider the imposition of a minimum wage wM > η that is binding for some
(untrained) workers in the second period. We start by writing wages in the presence of
minimum wage laws. With a similar reasoning to above, (1) changes to:
w2(ηi, NT ) = max {wM , ηi} , (4)
w2(ηiT ) = max {wM , ηi + φ} .
These expressions feature the “max” operator because the minimum wage may be less
than or greater than worker productivity. Profits with and without training are still:
Π(ηi, NT ) = (θηi − w1 (ηi)) + (ηi + δ − w2(ηi, NT ))
Π(ηi, T ) = (θηi − c− w1 (ηi)) + (ηi + δ + φ− w2(ηi, T ))
where now w1 (ηi) ≥ wM .
First, consider a worker for whom
ηi ≤ wM − φ. (5)
In this case, the second period wage is equal to the minimum even if this worker is
trained. Then,
Π(ηi, T )−Πj(ηi, NT ) = φ− c. (6)
Assumption 1 implies that (6) is strictly positive for all ηi. So in stark contrast to the
economy without minimum wages, firms now prefer to train all their employees whose
ability is low enough to satisfy (5). The firm has to pay the minimum wage irrespective
of whether the worker is skilled or not, so the full return to training is captured by the
employer–the firm is now the full residual claimant.
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Next, consider a worker for whom (5) does not hold, so that the second period wage
for this worker, if trained, exceeds the minimum. So he will be paid w2 (ηi, T ) = ηi + φ
if trained. Then,
Πj(ηi, T )−Πj(ηi, NT ) = wM − ηi − c, (7)
which can be positive or negative. If it is positive, i.e. if
ηi ≤ wM − c (8)
the firm makes higher profits from trained–rather than untrained–workers.
Because condition (8) is more restrictive than (5) (see Assumption 1), we will have
Πj(ηi, T ) ≥ Πj(ηi, NT ) if and only if (8) is satisfied. Nevertheless, condition (8) is not
suﬃcient for firm-sponsored training. Firms also need to make nonnegative profits; i.e.,
Πj(ηi, T ) ≥ 0. (9)
The minimum that a worker can be paid in the first period is wM , although the first
period wage may be higher than this. Hence, (9) requires
(1+ θ) ηi + δ + φ− c− wM −max {ηi + φ, wM} ≥ 0. (10)
All workers for whom (8) and (10) are satisfied will be trained.
We are now in a position to determine the equilibrium level of employment and
training. First, consider workers with ability ηi > wM − c. As indicated above, these
workers will not obtain training, and will be employed as long as firms make zero profits.
This requires
(1+ θ) ηi + δ − wM −max {ηi, wM} ≥ 0. (11)
Intuitively, in the second period, a worker with ability ηi > wM will receive the wage
w2 (ηi, NT ) = ηi. Therefore, the firm will employ this worker only if the loss that it
makes in the first period, θηi−wM , is less than the profit it expects to make in the second
period, δ. The calculation is somewhat diﬀerent for a worker with wM − c < ηi < wM ,
since the minimum wage will be binding for this worker in the second period, and so the
second period profit is ηi+ δ−wM . Combining these conditions, the number of workers
who will be employed, but not receive any training, is
N (wM) = 1−G
Ã
max
(
wM − c;
wM − δ
θ ,
2wM − δ
1+ θ
)!
, (12)
where the “max” operator takes care of various cutoﬀs involved.
If, in contrast, ηi ≤ wM − c, then it is more profitable for a firm to train the worker
rather than employ him as an untrained employee. Such a worker will be employed–and
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trained– as long as (10) holds. Therefore, the number of workers employed and trained
is5
T (wM) = max
("
G (wM − c)−G
Ã
wM − δ + c
θ
!#
; 0
)
(13)
Here, the max operator takes care of the fact that the expression in the square bracket
could be negative, in which case there would be no firm-sponsored training because
the firm would not be able to make zero profits by training its employees. In fact, in
this case, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for firm-sponsored training and for the
introduction of a minimum wage to increase training is
δ > δ∗ ≡ (1− θ)wM + (1+ θ) c. (14)
This highlights the importance of firm-specific rents. If δ = 0, then (14) cannot be sat-
isfied and the firm will therefore not find it profitable to train. Therefore, the deviation
from perfectly competitive labor markets is essential for minimum wages to increase
training. It is only with suﬃciently large rents–as implied by equation (14)– that
there will also be any firm-sponsored training.
We can now state the main result of this section (proof in the text):
Proposition 2 Suppose that a minimum wage satisfying wM > η is imposed. Then
the level of employment is N (wM)+T (wM) and T (wM) workers receive firm-sponsored
trained where N (wM) is given by (12) and T (wM) is given by (13). T (wM) is strictly
positive whenever (14) holds.
As in the standard neoclassical model, minimum wages reduce employment as now
N + T < 1 (whenever the lower support of the ability distribution, η, is less than
(wM − δ + c) /θ). But moderate minimum wages also induce firms to oﬀer training to
some of the aﬀected workers. To see this, consider the introduction of a minimum wage
wM satisfying condition (14) above in an economy without minimum wage. Before the
imposition of the minimum wage, there is no firm-sponsored training, and since workers
are unable to “buy” training from their employers, there is no training at all. After the
introduction of the minimum wage, training increases to T (wM). Therefore, minimum
wages can increase training in this economy.
5The full expression for the number of workers who receive
training is max
nh
G (wM − c)−G
³
max
D
wM−δ+c
θ ,
2wM−δ−φ+c
1+θ
E´i
, 0
o
. However, wM − c ≥ wM−δ+cθ
implies that wM−δ+cθ ≥
2wM−δ−φ+c
1+θ (since φ > c by Assumption 1).
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Intuitively, the firm has to pay minimum wages even for unskilled workers and a
binding minimum wage reduces the rents the firm receives from the employment rela-
tionship. Training raises the worker’s productivity, and therefore restores some of these
rents. Firm-specific rents (labor market imperfections) are crucial for this result. As
noted above, when δ = 0, there will be no training, since in this case condition (14) can
never be satisfied.
Figure 1 in the introduction gives the basic intuition. The minimum wage determines
the wage both at τ = 0 and τ = 1, so all productivity increases from training accrue to
the employer, as in the case when ηi ≤ wM −φ. The most interesting case might be the
one where wM−φ < ηi ≤ wM−c. If the minimum wage is low enough, it may induce the
firm to sponsor training but the worker receives some of the proceeds from the training,
because the productivity of the trained worker exceeds the minimum wage.6
Notice that the results continue to apply if wM is a wage above the legal minimum
that the firm has to pay to the worker, due to other imperfections such as bargaining.
Therefore, if an increase in the minimum creates spillover eﬀects to wages above the
minimum, our analysis predicts that firms may also be induced to train the workers
aﬀected by these spillovers. In practice, minimum wages appear to create spillover
eﬀects (e.g. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999), so we expect them to also
influence the training of low wage workers earning above the minimum.
Since the eﬀect of minimum wages on training analyzed here diﬀers sharply from the
prediction of the standard Becker theory, empirical evidence on minimum wages and
training can shed light on whether non-competitive features and restrictions on workers’
ability to finance their own training are important. In the next part of the paper, we
investigate whether minimum wages increase or reduce training investments for low-wage
workers.
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
The federal minimum wage was unchanged between 1981 and 1990, but various states
imposed their own minima above the federal level during the late 1980s. While minimum
wages were rather uniform across states before 1987 and after 1991, there was substantial
dispersion between these dates. We will exploit this variation. Table 1 displays the
statutory minimum wages in the US states over this period.
We use two complementary approaches to identifying the impact of minimum wages
6This is special to the case where the firm has to choose a discrete level of training. If the firm
could choose training continuously, it would never train the worker beyond the point where it has to
pay above the minimum wage in the second period (see Figure 1).
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on training. The first one, which we find most compelling, looks at the training of
workers who are directly aﬀected by an increase in the state or federal minimum wage.
The second approach looks at the relation between training and a measure of how binding
the minimum wage is across regions. This latter approach is most closely related to
the empirical work in the previous literature, and therefore serves as a check on the
robustness of our results.
4.1 Empirical Specification
The most direct way to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on training outcomes
is to look at workers who are actually aﬀected by changes in the minimum wage. In
order to illustrate the approach, consider the following regression equation
τirt = αmwirt + β0xit + dt + vr + µi + εirt (15)
where τrit is a measure of training for individual i in region r at time t, dt, vr and
µi are time, region, and individual eﬀects, and xit are other individual characteristics
like education, age, gender, and information about the job an individual holds. mwirt
is a measure of whether the minimum wage binds for individual i in region r at time
t. One measure for mwirt would be whether the actual wage of an individual is close
to the minimum wage for the region and time period. This has been the approach of
Schiller (1994) and Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) using cross-sectional variation. But
this strategy has the problem that other, possibly unobserved, person characteristics
which are correlated with the individual’s wage will also tend to be correlated with
training receipt.
We therefore diﬀerence eq. (15) to obtain
∆τirt = α∆mwirt + β0∆xit +∆dt +∆εirt. (16)
Changes in training should now be related to changes in whether a worker is aﬀected
by the minimum wage. As a measure of ∆mwirt we use a dummy variable which
indicates that the minimum wage increased from one year to the next, and the worker
earned below the new minimum wage in the base year. This measure captures workers
who are directly aﬀected by a change in the minimum wage, similar to Card’s (1992)
analysis of employment eﬀects. The measure relies purely on the variation of the
minimum wage and base period wages, but not changes in individual wages, which may
be correlated with the timing of the training received by a worker. Our analysis will focus
on individuals who do not move between states because moving would also confound
∆mwirt with behavioral eﬀects. Therefore, the region eﬀect does not appear in eq. (16).
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Although we feel that this analysis of eq. (16) exploits variation of the minimum
wage most directly, hence gives the most reliable results, previous studies have relied on
eq. (15) to study the impact of the level of the minimum wage on training. To make
our results more comparable to these previous studies, we also undertake analysis of the
levels equation. Rather than indicating aﬀected workers directly, the variablemwirt will
in this case measure how binding the minimum wage is in a particular state or region.
We start by using simply the actual minimum wage in region r at time t, wmrt . However,
the same federal minimum aﬀects more workers in low wage regions than in high wage
regions, and this source of variation would not be captured by wmrt . Therefore, we prefer
specifications in which a given level of the minimum wage is allowed to have diﬀerent
eﬀects in diﬀerent regions depending on their average wages. For this purpose, we
consider relative minimum wage measures wmrt/wr, where wr is a measure of the location
of the wage distribution in region r (the median wage of older workers) over the whole
sample period. This measure wr should not be aﬀected by the minimum wage itself, and
therefore just parameterizes the wage distribution, and wmrt/wr measures how high the
minimum wage is relative to the region’s wage distribution. Notice that we are not using
wrt which would move with the business cycle at the regional level, and might create a
spurious correlation if training incidence were also cyclical.
An obvious choice for the regions are states, since minimum wages also vary at the
state level. However, the wage distribution also varies within states, so that the relative
minimum wage measure can be defined for smaller regions. Apart from states, we use
two other measures. One partitions states into SMSAs and non-SMSA parts as our
region definition. This lets us exploit the often substantial variation in wage levels
between large SMSAs (like New York City) and rural areas in a state (like upstate New
York) in the analysis. In total, we distinguish 136 regions. Details on the construction
of these are available in Appendix 1. When we use states or these smaller regions, our
measure for wr is the average of the median wages of male workers age 35-54 in each
year between 1987 and 1992. The second “region” definition distinguishes between the
male and female wage distribution within states, i.e. wr uses the average of the median
wages of male workers age 35-54 in the state if the respondent is male, and of the median
wages of female workers age 35-54 if the respondent is female. This measure exploits the
fact that women should be more aﬀected by a given minimum wage than men because
women tend to earn less than men.
In the right hand panel of Table 1 we show the relative minimum wages using the
male medians by state and year over the sample period. It is apparent that there
is substantially more dispersion in this measure (which is still coarser than the other
regional measures we use below) than in the minimum wage itself. For example, the
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federal minimum wage increases between 1989 and 1991 raised the relative minimum
wage by only 0.055 in New Jersey but by 0.085 in Arkansas, both states without a state
minimum wage above the federal level in 1989. This illustrates how the scaling of the
minimum wage measure leverages the increase in the federal minimum wage across states
with diﬀerent wage distributions, even once we control for state eﬀects.
There are a number of practical problems in implementing the estimation of equations
(15) and (16). For example, training is not easily defined at a point in time. Because
most training spells only last for a short period of time, we will define τrit as referring
to all incidents of training within a single year. Thus, τrit will be 1 if the individual
received any training during the year, and 0 otherwise. In the diﬀerenced equation (16),
the dependent variable takes on the values -1, 0, and 1. We will estimate the models
as linear probability models, facilitating diﬀerencing and the inclusion of fixed eﬀects in
the levels version.
Looking at a time period as long as a year has its drawbacks. The minimum wage
may change within a year. In order to minimize the impact of this, we look at periods of
12 months starting in April and ending in March. Both federal minimum wage increases
in 1990 and 1991 went into eﬀect April 1. Some state minimum wage increases also took
eﬀect on April 1, but many did not. Whenever the minimum wage changed during the
year, we use an employment weighted average of the minimum wage in eﬀect during the
year.
The covariance matrix of the error term in eq. (16) will have a first order moving
average structure at the individual level. We therefore estimate standard errors with the
Huber estimator, which is robust to arbitrary cluster eﬀects at the individual level. This
covariance estimator is consistent in this case but not eﬃcient. In (15), the key regressor,
the minimum wage variable, only varies at the region and year level while we use indi-
vidual level data. Conventional standard errors may therefore overstate the precision of
the estimates (Moulton, 1986). Suppose the error term has the form εrit = λi+υrt+ξrit,
i.e. the error is composed of an individual level component λi, a region*time component
υrt, and a component ξrit, which is uncorrelated across individuals, regions, and time
periods. Notice that the error εrit will be heteroskedastic, since we are estimating a lin-
ear probability model. There is no straightforward way to calculate consistent standard
errors for this error structure. We extend the standard Huber estimator to allow for both
an individual level component and a region*time component in the error term. This
estimator seems to perform well in practice in samples of our size. We report formulas
and the results of some small Monte Carlo experiments in Appendix 2.
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4.2 The Data
Our data on training come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
The NLSY is a panel of youths aged 14 to 21 in 1979. This dataset is particularly
suitable for this project because it samples young workers, and it oversamples those
from disadvantaged backgrounds, who are more likely to work in jobs at or slightly
above the minimum wage (see Card and Krueger, 1995). We will follow the cohorts
interviewed in the NLSY from 1987 to 1992, years of significant changes in state and
federal minimum wages. During the 1988 to 1992 surveys, the NLSY asked a consistent
set of questions about on-the-job training during the previous year. The information
about the training includes length and type of the program, site, and whether the explicit
costs of the training were paid for by the employer or someone else. The first set of
training questions in 1988 refer to a longer time frame than the questions in subsequent
years, because no similar data were collected in 1987. In 1993, the module on training in
the survey was expanded substantially and the survey switched from paper and pencil to
computer assisted interviewing. We use some data from the 1993 survey to complement
information on training during the April 1992 to March 1993 year. There were some
other minor additions to the training questions before 1993 as well.
The sequence of questions on training begins with a lead-in stating
“I would now like to ask you about other types of schooling and training you
may have had, excluding regular schooling we have already talked about.
Some sources of occupational training programs include government training
programs, business schools, apprenticeship programs, vocational or technical
institutes, correspondence courses, company or military training, seminars,
and adult education courses.”
This suggests that respondents will mostly report relatively formal training programs
and neglect other sources of informal on-the-job training, a suspicion which has been
substantiated by Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999b) using the more detailed training data
in the NLSY starting in 1993. While this may be a drawback, this limitation of the data
is pervasive in this literature.
We are only interested in training programs which take place in firms, or are spon-
sored directly by the employer, not in courses taken by individuals outside work on
their own initiative or government sponsored training programs. We therefore classify
the following forms of training as “employer related training”: any training for which
the respondent gives as venue an apprenticeship program; formal company training; or
seminars or training programs at work run by someone other than the employer; or if
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the respondent classifies the training as on-the-job training or work experience; or if
the employer paid for the training (even though we do not interpret the answer to this
question as the employer necessarily bearing the investment costs). We do not classify
a training programs as employer related if the training was partly paid for by a govern-
ment program.7 For each training program we record the start date as reported on the
1988 to 1993 surveys. If this date falls within an April to March period between 1987
and 1993, we assign the training to this particular year. We treat observations with a
missing start date as missing.8
We do not use any information on the job or employer in the estimation directly.
However, training often takes place when individuals start new jobs, and minimum
wage increases may aﬀect turnover and hiring. Hence, it seems important to control for
turnover in some fashion. We include a dummy variable for whether a respondent started
any new job within a particular year from information in the work history module of
the data.
We limit our sample to workers who have 12 years of education or less, a group most
likely to be aﬀected by the minimum wage. We use the oversamples of blacks, Hispanics
and poor whites in the analysis, but we drop the military subsample. The results are
weighted by the NLSY sampling weights throughout. Individuals living in the District
of Columbia are excluded, because DC had a plethora of diﬀerent minimum wage rules,
making it hard to define a sensible overall measure of the minimum wage. Our basic
sample includes all workers who report a wage at the interview for the current year
and for the past year,9 and who were employed for at least one month during the year
according to the information in the work history module. We also restrict the sample
to those with valid wage information. For the analysis using eq. (16) we also include
individuals who move between states.
In addition, we use the 1987 to 1993 outgoing rotation group files of the CPS. We
calculate the median wage for workers age 35 to 54 from this data source to construct the
relative minimum wage measure. The CPS outgoing rotation groups are large enough
to do this even for smaller areas within states. For example, each region-year cell has
at least 27 observations on older male workers, but few cells are that small, and the
median number of observations is 274.
7The most common government program, JTPA, involves wage subsidies up to 50 percent if trainees
are placed with private sector employers. Hence, the incidence of training under this program is unlikely
to be aﬀacted by minimum wage legislation.
8The NLSY also provides information on the length of training. We do not use the duration of
training directly, because of the frequency of missing values but we checked that our results are robust
to excluding very short training spells.
9The NLSY refers to this wage measure as the CPS wage because of the CPS style question. The
CPS wage may refer to a prior job if the respondent is not working at the time of the interview.
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5 Empirical Results
Table 2 reports means of some demographic indicators for the three samples from the
NLSY. All samples include respondents with 12 years of schooling or less working in at
least one month during the year. Since young adults still obtain additional schooling in
this age range, the samples changes over time. The non-mover sample diﬀers little from
the unrestricted sample. About 20 to 25 percent of each sample report having started
a new job during the calendar year. While this includes secondary and temporary jobs,
the number matches relatively closely the fraction of low education workers in the same
age group who report tenure of 12 month or less on their current job in the January 1991
CPS. This relatively high rate of job starts reflects the large turnover among young, low
skilled workers.
The average nominal hourly wage in the basic sample rises from about $7.50 in 1987
to almost $10 in 1992. While a number of sample members earn the minimum wage or
less, as shown in the last row, the majority of respondents earn far above the minimum
wage. These samples therefore include many workers whose wage is not directly aﬀected
by the minimum. These higher wage workers eﬀectively form our control group in the
diﬀerenced analysis. When we look at the impact of the level of the minimum wage, on
the other hand, most of the sample members are not directly aﬀected by the minimum
wage, a problem which has also aﬀected previous studies. In order to address this issue
we also use a low wage sample, defined as workers employed at a wage which is 150
percent of the federal minimum or less in the previous year. The last two columns give
the basic descriptive statistics for this sample, which is about a third the size of the basic
sample. These low wage workers include more women and blacks. The number of high
school dropouts is only slightly higher. Average wages in this sample are much lower
and do not grow substantially over the sample period, due to the sample selection. We
think of this group as much more likely to be actually subject to the minimum wage or
spillovers resulting from it. Since a larger fraction of these workers are directly aﬀected
by the minimum wage, the standard theory predicts that we should find larger negative
eﬀects in this sample.
Table 3 reports sample means for some of the key variables in our regressions. The
first row of the table reports the incidence of training, which is around 10 percent. The
only exception is 1987, where the measured incidence is much lower. This is presumably
due to the fact that the training questions were first asked on the 1988 survey so that
the questions referring to 1987 had a longer recall period than for later years. There is
also a small drop in 1991, possibly due to the recession. If we exclude very short training
spells of 1 day or less, the incidence drops to about 7 to 8 percent.
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Our measure of the minimum wage in a region is the higher of the state and the federal
minimum wage. In Table 3, we report the average minimum wage in a year across all
regions. These averages are weighted by the residence of our sample population. In
1987, the average minimum wage was 3.36, when only Alaska, and the New England
states had state minima above the federal minimum wage of 3.35. It rises to 3.44
in 1988, mainly reflecting the increase in the California state minimum, and increases
further to 3.51 in 1989, due to new minimum wage laws in other states, among them
Oregon, Washington, and Pennsylvania. The standard deviation across respondents
reaches a high of 29 cents in this year, indicating a substantial amount of variation in
state minimum wage levels. This variation drops substantially in 1990 and 1991, when
the two federal increases raise the minima in those states which had not taken action
before. The averages of 3.87 and 4.26 are now only slightly above the federal minimum
wages of 3.80 and 4.25. In 1992, New Jersey raises its minimum wage to 5.05, increasing
the spread again.
For our analysis of equation (16), we use four diﬀerent measures for workers aﬀected
by the minimum wage. The first one includes all workers who earned less than the new
minimum wage in a year prior to a minimum wage increase. This includes workers who
report a wage below the initial minimum. The top panel of Table 3 shows that about 1.4
percent of the sample were aﬀected by minimum wage increases in 1988, mostly due to
the increase in the California minimum wage. The state increases in 1989 aﬀect slightly
more workers, but a large fraction of workers (7 and 9 percent, respectively) is only af-
fected by the federal increases in 1990 and 1991. The second measure excludes workers
below the minimum wage in the base year. It is not completely clear whether these
workers should be considered aﬀected or not. Minimum wage coverage was fairly univer-
sal during the time period we consider, so that these reports presumably reflect mostly
measurement error.10 Excluding workers with wages below the base period minimum
cuts the fraction of aﬀected workers about in half in each year.
An increase in the minimum may also aﬀect the wages of higher wage workers via
spillover eﬀects, and our model then predicts that their training should be aﬀected.
Lee (1999), for example, finds large spillover eﬀects from the minimum wage changes
during our sample period, and we report similar results below in Table 5. In order to
investigate whether spillovers aﬀect our results, we also report specifications that include
workers who initially earned above the new minimum in the aﬀected group. We choose
alternatively 150 and 130 percent of the new minimum wage. This yields about two to
four times as many aﬀected workers as our original measure. The bottom panel of Table
3 reports the relative minimum wage measures, i.e. the minimum wage divided by the
10It is also possible that respondents receiving tips do not include these in the wage measure.
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state, regional, or state/gender median for older workers. The changes in these measures
over time reflect again the increases in various state minimum wages and the federal
increases in 1990 and 1991.
5.1 Results Using Aﬀected Workers
Regression results for the first diﬀerenced version of the model are displayed in Table 4.
Apart from the minimum wage, the regressions include a constant (capturing any linear
eﬀects of age), a full set of time dummies and variables for the change in high school
graduation status and for whether the worker took a new job. High school graduates
are between 4 and 9 percentage points more likely to receive training. This eﬀect is
imprecisely estimated because there are few workers who acquire a high school degree or
equivalent during the sample period. Workers starting a new job are 3 to 4 percentage
points more likely to receive training and this eﬀect is estimated quite precisely. These
estimates are sensible and demonstrate that the training variable is able to pick up the
expected variation in the data.
The coeﬃcients on the variable for aﬀected workers are directly interpretable as the
eﬀect of raising the minimum wage on the incidence of training. The table displays
four diﬀerent specifications corresponding to four diﬀerent definitions of the “aﬀected”
variable and employs three diﬀerent samples, and hence implicitly three diﬀerent control
groups. In column (1), we define all workers whose wage in the previous year is below the
current minimum as aﬀected. All other workers in the sample serve as the control group.
The point estimate indicates that being aﬀected by a minimum wage increase raises the
probability of receiving training by 1 percentage point. The eﬀect is not statistically
significant, however.
The control group in column (1) comprises both higher workers in aﬀected and un-
aﬀected states as well as low wage workers in states and periods which had no minimum
changes. Even though our sample was chosen to represent a relatively homogeneous
set of workers, there is a good deal of heterogeneity. It is therefore sensible to limit
the control group to diﬀerent subgroups. Columns (2) uses the same definition of the
aﬀected variable but limits the control group to higher wage workers in the states which
were aﬀected by minimum wage changes. The point estimate of the impact of minimum
wages on training is almost the same. Column (3) performs the opposite exercise and
limits the control group to other low workers rather than higher wage workers. We
define this group as those workers whose wage in the previous period is less than 150
percent of the current minimum wage. Hence, it also includes workers in aﬀected states
and periods with wages slightly above those of aﬀected workers. The eﬀect of the min-
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imum wage on training is again very similar but slightly lower now. Our conclusion is
that the exact choice of control group plays very little role in the estimates.
The specifications in columns (1) to (3) counts workers who were reporting wages
below the previous minimum in the base year as aﬀected. It is possible that some of the
wages below the initial minimum were due to measurement error, these workers really
earn much higher wages and were not truly aﬀected by the minimum. Therefore we
exclude these workers from the aﬀected group in the columns (4) to (6). The results
are not very diﬀerent. Changing the control group again makes little diﬀerence.
Neither of the previous specifications allows spillovers of the minimum wage on work-
ers with slightly higher wages. In fact, these workers make up the bulk of the control
group in columns (3) and (6). If we redefine instead the aﬀected group as workers whose
previous wage was within 150 or 130 percent of the new minimum wage in columns (7)
and (8), we find basically zero eﬀects of minimum wages on training. It is quite possible
that the eﬀects drop slightly because these specifications count too many workers as
“aﬀected”.11
Overall, these results provide neither strong support for the standard theory nor for
our model. Average training incidence for workers aﬀected by a minimum wage increase
is 5.2 percent for the measure of aﬀected workers used in column (1). The 95 percent
confidence interval is consistent with declines in training as large as 1.8 percentage points
or increases up to 2.8 percentage points. This means we can reject that the minimum
wage eliminates more than a third of the training in this group. Similar conclusions are
obtained for the other specifications.
5.2 Results Using Minimum Wage Changes
While the results in Table 4 indicate no adverse eﬀects of minimum wages on training,
our methodology diﬀers somewhat from the previous literature. In this section we
present alternative results based on the regression equation (15). The sample we use in
this section also includes workers who move from state to state between interviews, but
this sample diﬀers little from the non-mover sample.
Recall that this sample contains many workers not directly aﬀected by the minimum
wage, so it is natural to worry about whether minimum wages will have a significant
eﬀect on the earnings of workers in this sample, since in the absence of such a finding,
11The training question that we use includes very short training programs, and it is important to
ensure that our results are not sensitive to eliminating these short spells. When we repeat these
regressions excluding training spells lasting a single day or less, we obtain slightly smaller coeﬃcients
for aﬀected workers, e.g. 0.004 for the measure in column (4) and -0.013 for the measure in column (8),
while the standard errors are basically unchanged.
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we may expect no eﬀect on training incidence either. Before turning to the impact of
minimum wages on training, we therefore look at the eﬀect of the minimum wage on
actual wages. Table 5 displays quantile regression estimates of the real wage of workers
in this sample on the real value of the minimum wage and a full set of year and state
dummies. The first feature of the results is that low quantiles of the wage distribution
are aﬀected by changes in the minimum wage, which shows that minimum wages do
have an eﬀect on the wages of low paid workers. So according to the standard theory,
there should be a negative eﬀect on training.
A one dollar increase in the minimum wage raises wages of the 10th percentile worker
in the NLSY by 37 cents, which may seem small. The second column in the table repli-
cates these results with a comparable sample using the CPS outgoing rotation groups,
with similar results, showing that these results are not particular to the NLSY. There
are various reasons to expect why the coeﬃcients even at the low quantiles should be less
than one. There is certainly much measurement error in the wage reports of workers,
biasing these coeﬃcients down. Furthermore, Table 2 revealed that even workers at the
10th percentile will typically earn above the old minimum wage already, and therefore
they may not receive the full increase when the minimum wage goes up. Nevertheless,
the results in Table 5 show that workers as high as the 30th percentile of the wage dis-
tribution may be aﬀected by minimum wage changes, and therefore their training may
also be aﬀected.
Table 5 also shows that there are many workers in this sample who are not aﬀected
by minimum wages. This means that our estimates of training eﬀects will tend to be
biased towards zero. This motivates our strategy to compare our basic results to those
in the lower wage sample using only workers earning less than 150 percent of the federal
minimum wage in the previous year, corresponding roughly to the workers up to the 30th
percentile of the original sample. This sample more closely approximates the workers
actually aﬀected by the minimum wage or by spillovers resulting from the minimum. If
the results in the larger sample are biased towards zero, then the more restrictive sample
should lead to more extreme estimates.
Table 6 presents our regression results for the incidence of training on the minimum
wage and relative minimum wage measures. We present four sets of regressions with
and without time and region fixed eﬀects, as well as one specification which includes
individual instead of region fixed eﬀects.12 Other covariates in the regressions are dum-
mies for blacks, Hispanics, females, high school graduates, and whether the individual
12If training this year makes it less likely that the individual will be trained in the future, the individual
eﬀects model may be problematic. However, in our sample, training is positively correlated over time.
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started a new job during the year, and a linear variable for age.13 The coeﬃcients on
the demographic covariates are again sensible. Blacks receive about 3 percentage points
less training and Hispanics 1.5 percentage points less. Contrary to the typical finding
in the literature, the eﬀect for women is very small and insignificant in this low wage
group. High school dropouts receive about 5 percentage points less training. Workers
starting new jobs are slightly more likely to receive more training but the eﬀect is only
sizeable at 2 percentage points and significant once individual eﬀects are controlled for.
If no region eﬀects are included, as in columns (1) and (2), the eﬀect of the minimum
wage measure is positive and significant. This reflects that states with higher minimum
wages tend to have more training. Because these states tend to have higher wages in
general, this may simply mean that high and low wage states diﬀer, for example in terms
of their industrial and occupational structure. In fact, the positive result in column
(2) vanishes when we look at the relative minimum wage measures below or when we
control for state and time eﬀects in column (4). This latter specification, which we
prefer, suggests that higher minimum wages have a small negative eﬀect on training.
The federal minimum wage increased by 81 cents in real terms from 1989 to 1991. This
increase led to about 0.6 percentage points less of training. We find similar results
including individual fixed eﬀects instead of state eﬀects in column (5).14
The estimates are more negative if we look at the low wage sample in row 2. Un-
fortunately, these results are very imprecisely estimated and are consistent with both
substantial negative and positive eﬀects. One reason for this is that the minimum wage
variable we are using in the first two rows does not exploit a relevant part of the infor-
mation, which is that a given level of the minimum wage will have very diﬀerent eﬀects
depending on how high wages are in a region. To exploit this information, we next turn
to the relative minimum wage measures.
Rows 3 and 4 of the table report results where we divide the minimum wage by
the median wage of older males in the state. The specification which exploits primarily
the cross region variation in the minimum wage measure in column (2) now results in
a moderate negative coeﬃcient. In row 5 below, where we use more detailed regions
and obtain more precise results, this coeﬃcient is even significant. This specification
compares most closely to the approach of Leighton and Mincer (1981). But the results
in columns (4) or (5), which are much closer to zero, indicate again that the minimum
13Curvature of the age profile is empirically unimporant for the small age range in the sample,
therefore we do not include higher order terms.
14In the specification with individual fixed eﬀects, only the region*time clusters remain in the error
term. The standard Huber estimator of the covariance matrix allowing for these clusters is consistent.
Our standard errors in column (5) are therefore the most reliable. Interestingly, the standard errors on
the minimum wage variable do not diﬀer substantially from those in column (4).
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wage measure was picking up across region diﬀerences in training incidence. We feel
that the estimates including time and region or individual eﬀects are most reliable.
Some of the time variation of our training measure is likely due to the change in the
survey questions and cyclical variations. Diﬀerences in training incidence across regions
may reflect diﬀerences in industrial and occupational compositions. The negative eﬀect
of the minimum wage in column (2) is therefore likely to reflect the fact that higher
wage regions tend to have more training. The results including time and region eﬀects,
which are the most reliable, do not indicate any negative eﬀects of minimum wages on
training.15
In order to interpret the magnitudes of the estimates and confidence intervals using
this relative measure of the minimum wage, return to the bottom panel of Table 3. The
relative minimum wages increased by about 5 to 6 percentage points from 1989 to 1991.
To gauge the impact of the federal increases, it is more useful to calculate the means
only for the states that were subject to the federal minimum in 1989. For these states,
the federal increases raised the relative minimum wage measures by 0.07 using the male
state or region medians, and by 0.08 using the state/gender medians. This means that
a 95 percent confidence interval for the estimates in column (4) using state medians for
the unrestricted sample excludes negative changes in training of 2.9 percentage points
or larger in response to the federal increases. It is instructive to compare this result to
the findings by Neumark and Wascher (1998), for example. Their point estimates imply
that the California state minimum wage (which was similar in magnitude to the federal
increase between 1989 and 1991) led to a decline in formal training of 3.2 percentage
points among young workers age 20-24, a group with a similar average training incidence
as our sample. We can reject a decrease of this size for our sample.
Looking at the low wage sample, we obtain a virtually identical point estimate when
we include time and state eﬀects. When we include individual instead of state eﬀects, the
point estimate is actually positive now. Thus, the results with the low wage sample do
not indicate that the estimates for the basic sample were attenuated. These conclusions
are unchanged when we look at the minimum wage measure scaled by alternative values
of the median wage. In rows 5 and 6, we use the median wage for 136 regions smaller
than the states. We find small positive point estimates for the basic sample, and
slightly larger estimates in the low wage sample. To the degree that these results
indicate attenuation in the basic sample, they suggest that the actual eﬀect of minimum
wages on training is positive, rather than negative. The within estimates using these
15Our theory predicts that minimum wages reduce employment, but our samples focus on employed
workers. This might bias our estimates up. When we use a sample of respondents including non-workers,
we actually find slightly more postive results, however.
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smaller regions turn out not to be any more precise than the state results, however.
The last two rows in Table 7 present results scaling the minimum wage by the median
wage for older workers in the same state and of the same gender as the respondent. The
results for the basic sample are again rather similar to the previous measures. The
results are now somewhat more precise, because there is more variation in the measure
exploiting gender diﬀerences. For the low wage sample, the results are a bit diﬀerent.
Controlling for time and state eﬀects, we now find a negative eﬀect for minimum wages.
However, this result is not replicated when we control for individual eﬀects instead.
In addition, if we tighten the low wage sample further to include only workers who
earned less than 130 percent of the federal minimum wage in the previous year, we find
a coeﬃcient of 0.097 (with a standard error of 0.294). We conclude that the negative
estimate for the low wage sample is much more likely an indication of the sampling
variation of these estimates rather than evidence that the estimates for the basic sample
are attenuated.
However, the results do not provide strong support for our model either. Although
some of the estimates are positive, and our baseline estimate is consistent with a 3.8
percentage point increase in the training probability of aﬀected workers, none of the
positive eﬀects are statistically significant.
5.3 Discussion of the Results
Overall, the results using either aﬀected workers, which is our preferred methodology, or
using minimum wage levels provide strong support neither for the standard theory nor
for our alternative model based on labor market imperfections. In fact, most estimates
show no–or little–eﬀect of minimum wages on training. This may be due to a variety
of reasons:
1. Training incidence is relatively small in this sample of low wage workers, and
with our sample size we may simply be unable to detect the eﬀects of minimum
wages. Mismeasurement of training in the data, of which there undoubtedly will
be some, will make this worse. However, we have demonstrated that we are able to
detect numerically small but significant eﬀects on other covariates. Our results also
diﬀer substantially from the previous literature and they are precise enough, for
example, to reject the point estimates obtained by Neumark and Wascher (1998).
Furthermore, our estimates are much more precise than theirs.
2. Measurement error may bias our estimates towards zero. In particular, the re-
gressions in Section 5.2 may include too many unaﬀected workers in the sample,
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therefore attenuating the eﬀect. While not definite, we have probed this explana-
tion by comparing the results from the base sample with a low wage sample. The
pattern of results does not suggest a major role for attenuation bias.
3. Our training measure does not distinguish general and specific training and most
training in our sample may be specific. If this training is already being financed
by firms, which could be likely for low wage workers, there is no reason to expect
that minimum wages lead to a reduction in training. But the literature on this
topic suggests that the bulk of reported training is very general. Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1999a) find in later waves of the NLSY that 63 percent of all training
is general, and in another 14 percent of training programs, most of the skills are
reported to be general. They find similar results with other datasets as well.
4. If most training is rather informal, the reduction in training may not show up in
our data. While possible, we believe that it is unlikely that formal and informal
training will behave very diﬀerently. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999b) analyze
questions on informal training in later waves of the NLSY, and find formal and
informal training to be highly correlated. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent
with Becker’s theory or our alternative model if minimum wages had no eﬀect on
formal training.
5. The implications of both Becker’s or our theory can be seen most starkly if training
is a zero-one choice. When training is a continuous choice, in Becker’s theory, a
higher minimum wage may eliminate some but not necessarily all training. This
will happen because some workers earn low wages because they are financing their
own training. A binding minimum wage will prevent them from financing all the
previous training but it may still be consistent with some worker financed training.
A similar argument could be made with respect to our model. Workers may
have received firm financed training even in the absence of minimum wages (see
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b). A minimum wage may have raised the intensity
of training without a large eﬀect on the number of trained workers. Given our
results, we cannot rule these possibilities. For reasons stated above, we do not
pursue the analysis of training durations.
6. Finally, our finding of small overall eﬀects on training could result from a com-
bination of the eﬀects in Becker’s model and our theory, where minimum wages
reduce training for some workers and induce training for others.
We do not believe that any single one of the statistical or theoretical arguments 1 — 5
above on its own is a suﬃcient explanation for our findings. Obviously, it is possible that
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a combination of these factors could account for our results. It is important to point out,
however, that all of the points 1 — 4 also aﬀect previous empirical studies on this topic,
since they have analyzed similar data with analogous limitations. Since all the previous
studies also have similar–and some other– problems, we find our results at least as
reliable as other studies on the topic. We conclude that small eﬀects of the minimum
wage on training are therefore a distinct possibility. This makes the last explanation for
the results appealing. In the next section, we develop a model which combines elements
of Becker’s theory with our model and derive some further empirical implications.
6 A Hybrid Model: The Eﬀect of Minimum Wages
When Workers Can Pay For Training
Our baseline model in Section 3 introduced two deviations from the standard Becker
model. Labor markets were noncompetitive, and workers were unable to pay for train-
ing. Under these assumptions, we derived the opposite of the prediction of the standard
Becker model: minimum wages were found to increase–rather than decrease–training.
Since the empirical evidence seems to support neither the standard Becker model nor
our model, we now generalize the model of Section 3 by allowing some of the workers to
invest in their general training.
We maintain all the assumptions from Section 3, and in addition, assume that some
of the workers can “buy” training from their employers, so the contractual problems
discussed in Section 3 are absent, at least for a certain fraction of the workers. In
particular, a fraction λ of the workers can pay for their training, as long as the minimum
wages do not rule out wage cuts. The remaining 1− λ fraction of the workers cannot.
For example, these workers have a consumption commitment and cannot borrow to meet
it if they take a wage cut to finance training.16 For brevity, we will refer to this latter
group of workers as “credit constrained.”
6.1 Equilibrium Without Minimum Wages
Equilibrium wages without the minimum wage continue to be given by equation (1)
in Section 3. Therefore, once again Πj(ηi, T ) − Πj(ηi, NT ) = −c, and firms have no
incentive to invest in their employees’ skills. But now, there can be worker-financed
training. More specifically, Assumption 1 ensures that all workers who can aﬀord it
16For simplicity, we assume that the probability of being able to finance training is independent
of the worker’s ability. All the results go through in a more realisitc model, where workers smooth
consumption over the two periods and some workers are credit constrained.
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will prefer to get training by taking a wage cut. Therefore, a worker with access to
credit will always receive training, whereas constrained workers will be unable to obtain
training. All workers will be employed, and competition among firms will ensure that
first-period wages are given by
w1 (ηi, T ) = θηi + δ − c (17)
for workers financing their training, and
w1 (ηi, NT ) = θηi + δ (18)
for workers not paying for their training.
In this competitive equilibrium, all training is therefore of the Becker-type, financed
by workers taking a wage cut in the first period. The total number of workers obtaining
training is simply
T c = λ.
The only reason why the equilibrium is not first-best is because some of the workers are
credit constrained and cannot invest in training even though doing so would increase
total output.
6.2 The Impact of Minimum Wages on Training
Now consider a binding minimum wage, i.e. wM such that wM > η. Similar reasoning
to above immediately implies that second period wages are given by equation (4).
Let us first discuss the adverse eﬀect of the minimum wage on investment in skills,
which were absent in Section 3. Some of the workers previously financing their own
training will now be unable to do so because paying for their own training would involve
receiving a wage below the minimum in the first period. In particular, all workers with
access to credit and productivity such that
θηi + δ − c < wM . (19)
will be unable to take the necessary wage cut to finance training.17 Therefore, the
number workers obtaining training by taking a wage cut is now
λ
"
1−G
Ã
wM − δ + c
θ
!#
, (20)
17This is without a training subminimum. In this model, as in the standard Becker model, introducing
training subminima increases training.
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which is clearly a decreasing function of wM . So a binding minimum wage reduces
training for some workers. In a competitive labor market this is the only impact of
the minimum wage on training. Since all training is general in this economy, the mini-
mum wage eliminates all training among aﬀected workers (i.e. those workers for whom
equation (19) holds).
There is still the second mechanism at work which we described in Section 3 above.
The introduction of a minimum wage induces firms to train some of their low skilled
workers. Consider a worker who does not have access to credit, and hence could not
aﬀord to buy training when there was no minimum wage. From the results in Section
3, it is more profitable for a firm to pay for the training of some workers than to use
them as unskilled employees. The analysis is identical to that in Section 3, except that
the firm may finance the training of workers, who can pay for this training themselves,
but are constrained by wM . (19) has to be satisfied for these workers, but this implies
immediately that (10) has to be violated, i.e. it is not profitable for firms to sponsor
training of these workers. Therefore, total training in equilibrium with a minimum wage
is
Tnc = λ
"
1−G
Ã
wM − δ + c
θ
!#
+ (21)
(1− λ)max
("
G (wM − c)−G
Ã
wM − δ + c
θ
!#
; 0
)
where the second term is the amount of firm-sponsored training given by T (wM) in
equation (13) above.
Notice that if δ = 0–i.e., if there are no employment rents–, then the term in
the second line in (21) will be equal to zero as discussed in Section 3. In this case,
Tnc = λ [1−G ((wM + c)/θ)], and therefore, the implications of a minimum wage will
be identical to the standard Becker model. In contrast, when δ > 0, minimum wages
can increase training.
Now consider the introduction of a minimum wage wM , and compare two sectors
with diﬀerent values of δ, i.e. diﬀerent amounts of rents. A prediction of the hybrid
model here is that in sectors where δ < δ∗ given by (14) in Section 3, the introduction of
the minimum wage reduces training, whereas in sectors with δ ≥ δ∗, the minimum wage
may increase training. This observation implies a useful empirical implication, which
we will investigate empirically in the next section. In particular, we will look at the eﬀect
of minimum wages on sectors that diﬀer by the extent of rents and competitiveness.
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7 Further Evidence
In this section, we make a first attempt at providing some evidence that industry struc-
ture matters for the eﬀects of minimum wages on training. We use the industry wage
diﬀerential as a proxy for the rents present in an industry (see Katz and Summers, 1989).
We estimated industry wage diﬀerentials for 47 two digit industries for all workers age
18 to 65 in the 1986 CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups.18 We then split these
industries into two groups depending on the estimated wage diﬀerential, each group
containing half of total employment in the CPS sample. The group with a lower in-
dustry wage diﬀerential is presumed to comprise more competitive industries, the group
with higher industry wage diﬀerentials the less competitive ones. These groups are then
assigned to each observation in the NLSY based on the industry aﬃliation in the previ-
ous year (since current industry aﬃliation may potentially be aﬀected by the minimum
wage).
In Table 7, we repeat the regressions for aﬀected workers as in Table 4 using the whole
sample, and add a dummy variable for less competitive industries and an interaction of
this variable with the aﬀected indicator. We also repeat the same regressions using
the industry wage diﬀerential directly, rather than splitting industries into two distinct
groups. In this case, we scaled the industry wage diﬀerential such that the industry
with the lowest diﬀerential (private household services) is set to zero. The range of the
industry wage diﬀerentials goes up to 0.85 (petroleum), the mean in the NLSY sample
is 0.52, and the mean for aﬀected workers is around 0.40. The model in the previous
section predicts that the interaction term should have a positive coeﬃcient–which would
correspond to a more positive eﬀect of minimum wages in less competitive industries.
The results in Table 7 are largely supportive of the model. When we use the interac-
tion with the industry split we find zero or small negative coeﬃcients on the variable for
aﬀected workers. This now captures the eﬀect on workers in more competitive industries.
The eﬀects on the interaction with the indicator for a less competitive (higher industry
wage diﬀerential) industry are throughout positive. The magnitude of the diﬀerence is
quite substantial, though typically not statistically significant. In columns (2) and (3)
the interaction term has a magnitude of about 0.03, indicating that training may go
up by as much as 3 percentage points more for aﬀected minimum wage workers in less
competitive industries. The interaction eﬀect is not very precisely estimated, however,
because there are relatively few minimum wage workers in these high wage industries.
The results are similar when we use the industry wage diﬀerential directly, rather than
18The regression also includes years of schooling, a quartic in experience, dummies for female, married,
a female-married interaction, black, Hispanic, SMSA, and three region dummies. The sample size is
169,921.
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a discrete industry split. The main eﬀect on the indicator for aﬀected workers is now to
be interpreted as the eﬀect on workers in the private household sector. This eﬀect is large
and negative. This is consistent with the notion that some workers in the sectors with
the lowest industry wage diﬀerentials were financing some training themselves, and this
training is being eliminated by the increase in the minimum wage. The interaction term
with the industry wage diﬀerential is again positive and of the order of 0.1 in columns
(6) and (7). This means that each 10 percentage point increase in the wage diﬀerential
is associated with a 1 percentage point lower reduction in the amount of training due
to the minimum wage. For example, the results in column (6) imply that the minimum
wage has no eﬀect on training in social services (with an industry wage diﬀerential of
0.32 above the private household sector), while raising training by 3 percentage points
for a worker in the wholesale industry (with an industry wage diﬀerential of 0.56 above
private household). When we allow for spillovers from the minimum wage, as in columns
(7) and (8), the interaction term is significant. While these results are far from definite,
they are encouraging for the hybrid model.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes some theoretical as well as empirical contributions to the literature on
minimum wages. The perceived wisdom is that minimum wages ought to lower training
for aﬀected workers. This conclusion is based on competitive labor markets and the
ability of workers to “buy” training from firms. We show that it is possible to obtain
the opposite theoretical prediction in a model where there are employment rents due to
labor market fictions and workers cannot finance their own training.
In addition, we provide a new set of estimates based on minimum wage changes at
the state and federal level during the late 1980s. This evidence indicates no or only
small eﬀects of minimum wages on training, a result which does not clearly support
either model.
To reconcile these results, we integrate elements of the standard Becker model, where
workers pay for general training, with a model in which firms pay for the training. The
overall eﬀect of minimum wages on training is ambiguous in this hybrid model, but the
model also has some new predictions. The eﬀect of minimum wages on training should
depend on the labor market structure. When employment rents are more important,
a positive eﬀect of minimum wages on training is more likely. We provided evidence
consistent with this implication using industry wage diﬀerentials as a measure of industry
rents.
Future research should establish whether the relationship between the eﬀect of mini-
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mum wages and the competitive conditions of the industry holds up in other dimensions
as well. In addition, the model also implies that minimum wages should increase training
more for workers who are more likely to be credit constrained. It would be interesting to
investigate this issue. Unfortunately, the NLSY does not contain good measures of the
extent of credit constraint for individuals, so this issue is also left for future research.
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9 Appendix 1: Construction of Regions
Some of the minimum wage measures used in this paper scale the state minimum wage
level by a regional reference wage. An NLSY respondent’s reference wage is the median
wage in his/her geographic region for 35-54 year old male workers calculated from the
CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups. This appendix explains how the regions were con-
structed.
To account for the fact that there is significant variation in average wages within many
states, and to allow the minimum wage measure to have greater within-state variation,
we used information on an NLSY respondent’s CMSA/MSA of residence, (“msa code”).
Because of sample sizes, we used msa code only for individuals residing in the large
MSAs. For all other areas (i.e., smaller MSAs and non-MSAs), we used data on whether
an individual resided in an MSA (“msa status”).
The following list contains the 35 MSAs we classified as large. We included the 20
CMSAs defined by the 1990 FIPS Guidelines (plus the St. Louis, MO CMSA, while we
do not distinguish the Providence, RI CMSA from other metropolitan parts of RI) and
added 15 MSAs with large populations.
Atlanta, GA
Baltimore, MD
Boston-Lawrence-Salem, MA-NH CMSA
Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls, NY CMSA
Chicago-Gary Lake County, IL-IN CMSA
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY CMSA
Cleveland-Akron-Lorraine, OH CMSA
Columbus, OH
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA
Denver-Boulder, CO CMSA
Detroit-Ann Arbor, MI CMSA
Hartford-New Britain-Middletown, CT CMSA
Houston, TX CMSA
Indianapolis, IN
Kansas City, KS
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside, CA CMSA
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL CMSA
Milwaukee-Racine, WI CMSA
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
New Orleans, LA
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New York-New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT CMSA
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA
Orlando, FL
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton, PA-DE-NJ CMSA
Phoenix , AZ
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA CMSA
Portland-Vancouver, OR CMSA
Sacramento, CA
St. Louis, MO CMSA
San Antonio, TX
San Diego, CA
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA
Seattle-Tacoma, WA CMSA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Washington, DC, DC-MD-VA
The full set of regions consists of state-msa code level regions for the above 35 MSAs
and state-msa status level regions for all other areas. The example of an individual
living in Massachusetts illustrates how the reference wage is chosen. If the individual
lived in the Boston CMSA, the reference wage would be the median wage for 35-54
year old male workers living in the Massachusetts part of the Boston CMSA (the “MSA
median”). If the individual lived in a metropolitan area other than the Boston CMSA,
the reference wage would be the median wage for 35-54 year old male workers living in
Massachusetts metropolitan areas other than the Boston CMSA. If the individual lived
in a non-metropolitan area, the reference wage would be the median wage for 35-54 year
old male workers living in Massachusetts non-metropolitan areas (“non-MSA median”).
For confidentiality reasons, both the NLSY and CPS sometimes suppress the specific
MSA of residence for individuals in smaller MSAs and/or smaller states. In the CPS
data, there were five states in which msa status was sometimes suppressed: Maryland,
Nevada, Rhode Island, Utah and Wyoming. We classified these suppressed observations
as non-MSA, with the following rationale. In Maryland, the suppressed observations are
from the Maryland part of the Philadelphia CMSA. In Nevada, they are from the non-
central city part of the Reno MSA. In Rhode Island, they are from the Rhode Island part
of the New London MSA. In Utah, they are from the Utah part of the Flagstaﬀ MSA.
Finally, no MSAs in Wyoming are identified. For all five states, an individual was either
classified as living in an MSA or the information was suppressed, i.e. observations from
fringes of MSAs were grouped with the non-MSA observations to ensure confidentiality.
Thus, classifying all the individuals living in areas with suppressed codes as non-MSA
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seems the most sensible choice.
In addition, there are MSAs which straddle diﬀerent states and sometimes part of an
MSA in a particular state is not identified if the part is too small. This was the case for:
the Indiana part of the Cincinnati MSA, the Maryland part of the Philadelphia CMSA,
the North Carolina part of the Norfolk MSA and the Wisconsin part of the Chicago
CMSA and Minneapolis MSA. The CPS groups these areas with other metropolitan ar-
eas, and thus it is appropriate to use the state-MSA median for these observations in the
NLSY. Finally, in Maryland, the Cumberland, MD-WV MSA and the Hagerstown, MD
MSA are not separately identified. Here we assign the non-MSA median since Mary-
land’s non-MSA median is really a median excluding the Baltimore and Washington,
D.C. MSAs.
In the NLSY data, there were two complications. First, as in the CPS, msa status
was suppressed for certain individuals. We dropped the suppressed observations (62 out
of 21,680 observations from the Basic Sample). Second, the NLSY uses NECMAs for
the New England states whereas the CPS uses CMSA/MSAs. The NLSY switched to
NECMA codes in 1988; we constructed the NECMA codes for 1987 by using information
on state and county of residence. We then mapped NECMA codes into MSA codes.
Specifically, individuals living in the Boston NECMA or Hartford NECMAwere classified
as living in the Boston CMSA and Hartford CMSA, respectively. Also, individuals living
in any NECMA were classified as living in an MSA.
All together, the unrestricted NLSY sample contains 21,618 observations from 136
regions and 753 region-year categories. Of the 136 regions, 44 correspond to state-
msa code level regions, 45 to state-MSA level regions and 47 to state-non-MSA regions.
These regions form a partition of the country. The median number of observations in
each region-year cell in the CPS is 274 and the range is 27 (for the Indiana part of the
Chicago CMSA in 1991) to 2261 (the Los Angeles CMSA in 1990). Less than 10 percent
of all cells have fewer than a 100 observations and less than 5 percent of the NLSY
observations fall into those cells.
10 Appendix 2: Estimation of the Standard Errors
We assume that the error term has the form εij = λi+υj+ξij where i denotes individual
and j denotes region*time. Let xij be a vector of right-hand side variables,
Xi =


x0i1
x0i2
...
x0iJ


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the matrix of right-hand side variables for individual i, and X the stacked matrix of all
the Xi’s. To simultaneously adjust for individual and region*time eﬀects, we use the
covariance matrix bV = (X 0X)−1X 0ΩX(X 0X)−1
where
X 0ΩX =
X
i
X 0i bεibε0iXi +X
i6=k
X
j
bεij bεkjxijx0kj.
In order to get an idea how this covariance estimator performs in our sample, we
conducted a small Monte Carlo experiment. For this experiment we generated samples
with the same number of observations, individuals, regions, and time periods as in our
unrestricted sample according to the design
y∗ij = 0.4 + 0.1x1ij + 0.1x2j + 0.1x3i + λi + υj + ξij
yij =
(
1 if p ≤ y∗ij
0 if p > y∗ij
where p and each of the x’s are drawn from a uniform (0,1) distribution and λi, υj, ξij
∼ N(0, 0.1). In regression 1, we computed the OLS estimate of y on the three x’s and
constructed the covariance matrix above. In regression 2, we estimated the regression
of y on the x’s also including region and time fixed eﬀects. We replicated each regression
10000 times with the following results:
Regression 1 Regression 2
regressor x1ij x2j x3i x1ij x2j x3i
standard deviation of bβ 0.0116 0.0320 0.0126 0.0116 0.0355 0.0124
mean of estimated standard error 0.0116 0.0314 0.0124 0.0115 0.0304 0.0122
Year Eﬀects No Yes
Region Eﬀects No Yes
Regression 1 indicates that the covariance estimator does a good job in estimating the
sampling variation for all regressors. However, in regression 2, the sampling variation
for x2j, which only varies at the region*time level, i.e. the analogue to our minimum
wage measure, is understated by about 15 percent. Of course, these results are only
suggestive. In our design, υj contributes a third to the total variance of the error term.
The results would change as we change the relative variances of this error component.
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Table 1 
Minimum Wage and Relative Minimum by State and Year 
 Statutory Minimum Wage Minimum Wage/Avg. Median Wage Age 35-54 
State 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Alabama 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.308 0.306 0.305 0.344 0.383 0.381 
Alaska 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.30 4.75 4.75 0.215 0.214 0.213 0.237 0.260 0.259 
Arizona 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.262 0.261 0.260 0.293 0.326 0.325 
Arkansas 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.342 0.341 0.339 0.382 0.426 0.424 
California 3.35 3.35/4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 0.234 0.279 0.294 0.292 0.291 0.290 
Colorado 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.245 0.244 0.243 0.274 0.305 0.304 
Connecticut 3.37/3.75 3.75/4.25 4.25 4.25 4.27 4.27 0.236 0.265 0.279 0.277 0.277 0.276 
Delaware 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.242 0.241 0.240 0.270 0.301 0.300 
Florida 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.304 0.303 0.302 0.340 0.378 0.377 
Georgia 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.290 0.288 0.287 0.324 0.360 0.359 
Hawaii 3.35/3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.25 4.75/5.25 0.251 0.276 0.275 0.273 0.300 0.343 
Idaho 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.296 0.294 0.293 0.330 0.368 0.366 
Illinois 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.239 0.238 0.237 0.268 0.298 0.297 
Indiana 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.281 0.280 0.279 0.314 0.350 0.348 
Iowa 3.35 3.35 3.35/3.85 3.85/4.25 4.25/4.65 4.65 0.285 0.283 0.293 0.330 0.363 0.386 
Kansas 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.270 0.269 0.267 0.301 0.335 0.334 
Kentucky 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.291 0.290 0.288 0.325 0.362 0.361 
Louisiana 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.289 0.288 0.286 0.323 0.359 0.358 
Maryland 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.235 0.234 0.233 0.262 0.292 0.291 
Massachusetts 3.55/3.65 3.65/3.75 3.75 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.250 0.256 0.256 0.258 0.287 0.286 
Michigan 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.231 0.230 0.229 0.258 0.287 0.286 
Minnesota 3.35/3.55 3.55/3.85 3.85/3.95 3.95/4.251 4.25 4.25 0.256 0.272 0.288 0.292 0.312 0.311 
Mississippi 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.340 0.339 0.337 0.380 0.423 0.422 
Missouri 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.279 0.278 0.277 0.312 0.348 0.346 
Montana 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.292 0.290 0.289 0.326 0.363 0.361 
Nebraska 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.303 0.302 0.300 0.338 0.377 0.375 
Nevada 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.266 0.265 0.264 0.297 0.331 0.330 
New Hampshire 3.45/3.55 3.55/3.65 3.65/3.75 3.75/3.85 4.25 4.25 0.257 0.263 0.269 0.277 0.308 0.307 
New Jersey 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 5.05 0.216 0.216 0.214 0.242 0.269 0.319 
New Mexico 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.284 0.283 0.281 0.317 0.353 0.352 
New York 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.238 0.237 0.236 0.266 0.296 0.295 
North Carolina 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.315 0.313 0.312 0.352 0.391 0.390 
North Dakota 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.291 0.290 0.288 0.325 0.361 0.360 
Ohio 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.260 0.259 0.258 0.291 0.324 0.322 
Oklahoma 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.282 0.281 0.279 0.315 0.350 0.349 
Oregon 3.35 3.35 3.35/4.252 4.25/4.75 4.75 4.75 0.262 0.261 0.287 0.336 0.364 0.363 
Pennsylvania 3.35 3.35/3.70 3.70 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.269 0.273 0.294 0.300 0.334 0.333 
Rhode Island 3.55/3.65 3.65/4.00 4.00/4.25 4.25 4.45 4.45 0.281 0.302 0.321 0.324 0.338 0.337 
South Carolina 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.305 0.304 0.302 0.341 0.379 0.378 
South Dakota 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.337 0.336 0.334 0.377 0.420 0.418 
Tennessee 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.331 0.329 0.328 0.370 0.411 0.410 
Texas 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.280 0.279 0.278 0.313 0.348 0.347 
Utah 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.259 0.258 0.256 0.289 0.322 0.320 
Vermont 3.45/3.55 3.55/3.65 3.65/3.75 3.85 4.25 4.25 0.306 0.313 0.320 0.324 0.361 0.360 
Virginia 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.252 0.251 0.249 0.281 0.313 0.312 
Washington 3.35 3.35/3.85 3.85/4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 0.236 0.244 0.277 0.294 0.293 0.292 
West Virginia 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.294 0.293 0.292 0.329 0.366 0.365 
Wisconsin 3.35 3.35 3.35/3.65 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.270 0.269 0.286 0.302 0.336 0.335 
Wyoming 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 0.263 0.262 0.261 0.294 0.327 0.326 
 
1 Minnesota: Only large employers covered by the new 1991 minimum wage. 
2 Oregon: Minimum wage changed from 3.35 to 3.85 and then 4.25 during the year. 
Notes: Left hand panel of the table shows the higher of the state or federal minimum wages in each state and year.  Years begin in April 
of the year shown until March of the following year.  Multiple minima are shown if the state minimum changed during the April to 
March period.  The right hand panel of the table shows the minimum wage divided by the average median wage for male workers 35-54 
years old in the state during the 1987 to 1992 period. 
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Table 2 
Sample Means of Demographics 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Non-mover Sample Unrestricted 
Sample 
Low Wage Sample 
Variable 1988 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 
Female 0.434 0.428 0.432 0.427 0.527 0.602 
Black 0.134 0.132 0.128 0.133 0.169 0.204 
Hispanic 0.067 0.067 0.064 0.067 0.061 0.073 
Age 27.2 31.2 26.2 31.2 25.8 31.1 
Less than High School 0.187 0.171 0.192 0.172 0.262 0.240 
New Job 0.273 0.216 0.268 0.220 0.338 0.323 
Nominal Hourly Wage  
 
8.16 
(5.36) 
9.71 
(6.54) 
7.58 
(5.51) 
9.70 
(6.51) 
5.13 
(2.57) 
5.91 
(2.82) 
Real Hourly Wage  
(1982-84 $) 
7.30 
(4.79) 
8.52 
(5.73) 
6.81 
(4.95) 
8.51 
(5.71) 
4.60 
(2.30) 
5.18 
(2.47) 
Fraction Earning Minimum or Less  0.042 0.058 0.068 0.059 0.155 0.162 
Number of Observations 3872 3094 3979 3143 1673 1049 
 
Notes: Unbalanced panel from the NLSY.  Unrestricted sample consists of individual–year observations that have high 
school education or less, work in at least one month of the year and in both the prior and current year have non-missing 
wage data.  Non-mover sample excludes from the unrestricted sample individuals who have moved to a new state since the 
previous year.  Low wage sample imposes on the unrestricted sample the restriction that the “CPS wage” in the previous 
year is less than or equal to 150% of the federal minimum wage.  Year refers to April to March (of following calendar 
year).  New job refers to the start of any new job during the year.  Hourly wage is the “CPS wage” for workers employed at 
a “CPS job” only.  NLSY data include black, Hispanic and poor white oversamples.  The poor white oversamples were 
discontinued in the 1991 survey year, accounting for the lower number of observations in 1992.  Statistics are weighted by 
the NLSY sampling weights. 
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Table 3 
Sample Means of Key Variables 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Variable 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Non-mover Sample 
Training Incidence  0.099 0.099 0.106 0.094 0.103 
Nominal Minimum Wage  3.44 
(0.21) 
3.51 
(0.29) 
3.87 
(0.16) 
4.26 
(0.05) 
4.28 
(0.15) 
Minimum wage increased and wage 
in prior year is below the current 
minimum wage 
 0.014 0.020 0.069 0.091 0.001 
Minimum increased and wage in prior 
year is below the current minimum 
and above prior year minimum 
 0.007 0.008 0.034 0.050 0.000 
Minimum wage increased and wage 
in prior year is below 150 % of the 
current minimum wage 
 0.062 0.085 0.264 0.293 0.011 
Minimum wage increased and wage 
in prior year is below 130 % of the 
current minimum wage 
 0.041 0.058 0.166 0.204 0.007 
Number of Observations  3872 3793 3187 3128 3094 
Unrestricted Sample 
Training Incidence 0.064 0.099 0.100 0.108 0.094 0.103 
Nominal Minimum Wage 3.36 
(0.06) 
3.44 
(0.21) 
3.51 
(0.29) 
3.87 
(0.16) 
4.26 
(0.05) 
4.28 
(0.15) 
Real Minimum Wage 
(1982-84 $) 
3.02 
(0.05) 
3.08 
(0.19) 
3.12 
(0.26) 
3.42 
(0.14) 
3.75 
(0.05) 
3.76 
(0.13) 
Minimum Wage/Median Wage (men 
35-54, states) 
0.267 
(0.030) 
0.271 
(0.027) 
0.276 
(0.028) 
0.301 
(0.031) 
0.331 
(0.038) 
0.332 
(0.037) 
Minimum Wage/Median Wage (men 
35-54, regions) 
0.272 
(0.043) 
0.277 
(0.041) 
0.282 
(0.042) 
0.307 
(0.045) 
0.338 
(0.053) 
0.340 
(0.051) 
Minimum Wage/Median Wage (35-
54, state and gender) 
0.324 
(0.077) 
0.330 
(0.076) 
0.336 
(0.078) 
0.366 
(0.086) 
0.402 
(0.097) 
0.404 
(0.097) 
Number of Observations 3979 4046 3971 3303 3210 3143 
 
Notes:  See Table 2 for a description of the sample composition. Training incidence refers to employment related training. 
Minimum wage refers to the higher of the state or federal minimum applicable to an NLSY respondent.  Median wage for 
35-54 year old workers are calculated from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups.  The poor white oversamples were 
discontinued in the 1991 survey year, accounting for the lower number of observations in 1990 to 1992.  Statistics are 
weighted by the NLSY sampling weights. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Minimum Wage Increases on Affected Workers 
Comparison Group All Affected 
States 
Low 
Wage 
Workers 
All Affected 
States 
Low 
Wage 
Workers 
All All 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year 
is below the current minimum wage 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Minimum increased and wage in prior year is 
below the current minimum and above prior year 
minimum 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year 
is below 150 % of the current minimum wage 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
0.005 
(0.008) 
 
-- 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year 
is below 130 % of the current minimum wage 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
Change in high school graduation status 0.070 
(0.054) 
0.091 
(0.083) 
0.040 
(0.041) 
0.070 
(0.054) 
0.090 
(0.083) 
0.040 
(0.041) 
0.070 
(0.054) 
0.071 
(0.054) 
Change in new job status 
 
0.032 
(0.008) 
0.039 
(0.012) 
0.039 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
0.039 
(0.012) 
0.039 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
Number of Observations 17074 7552 5873 17074 7552 5873 17074 17074 
 
Notes: Non-mover sample, consisting of all workers with a high school education or less, who do not move between states  from one year to the next.   The low 
wage comparison sample consists of all workers with wages in the prior year below 150 % of the current minimum wage.  Dependent variable is the change in 
training incidence between two consecutive years.  All regressions also include a constant and year dummies.  Regressions are weighted by NSLY sampling 
weights.  Standard errors are adjusted for the presence of individual effects in the error term, and therefore robust to the MA structure of the error.   
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Table 5 
Quantile Regressions for Real Wage on Real Minimum Wage 
Unrestricted Sample 
Quantile NLSY CPS 
0.10 0.376 
(0.087) 
0.247 
(0.024) 
[0.084] 
0.20 0.156 
(0.105) 
0.137 
(0.011) 
[0.109] 
0.30 0.146 
(0.163) 
0.052 
(0.016) 
[0.121] 
0.40 0.049 
(0.158) 
0.032 
(0.045) 
[0.102] 
0.50 0.137 
(0.178) 
0.000 
(0.025) 
[0.111] 
0.60 0.029 
(0.173) 
0.130 
(0.053) 
[0.113] 
0.70 -0.120 
(0.247) 
0.030 
(0.043) 
[0.135] 
0.80 0.296 
(0.446) 
0.011 
(0.044) 
[0.198] 
0.90 0.312 
(0.593) 
0.157 
(0.143) 
[0.282] 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
State Effects Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Samples include respondents with a high school degree or less.  Dependent variable is the real hourly wage.  NLSY 
regressions are weighted by the NLSY sampling weights.  Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for clusters in the 
error term. Bootstrapped standard errors using state*year blocks are in brackets (100 replications). Number of observations 
is 21618 in the NLSY, and 119464 in the CPS.
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Table 6 
Panel Regressions for Training Incidence 
Sample Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unrestricted Real Minimum Wage 0.038 
(0.012) 
0.053 
(0.019) 
0.026 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
Low Wage Real Minimum Wage -0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.032) 
-0.034 
(0.054) 
Unrestricted Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (men 35-54, states) 
-0.003 
(0.081) 
-0.186 
(0.100) 
0.305 
(0.103) 
-0.028 
(0.211) 
-0.099 
(0.224) 
Low Wage Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (men 35-54, states) 
-0.020 
(0.120) 
-0.018 
(0.142) 
0.016 
(0.153) 
-0.169 
(0.406) 
0.198 
(0.416) 
Unrestricted Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (men 35-54, regions) 
-0.070 
(0.060) 
-0.177 
(0.067) 
0.307 
(0.100) 
0.038 
(0.193) 
0.050 
(0.172) 
Low Wage Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (men 35-54, regions) 
-0.052 
(0.079) 
-0.063 
(0.078) 
0.050 
(0.146) 
0.117 
(0.371) 
0.270 
(0.328) 
Unrestricted Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (35-54, state and gender) 
-0.024 
(0.063) 
-0.169 
(0.081) 
0.237 
(0.083) 
0.047 
(0.148) 
-0.017 
(0.167) 
Low Wage Real Minimum Wage/Avg. Median 
Wage (35-54, state and gender) 
-0.037 
(0.081) 
-0.049 
(0.096) 
-0.013 
(0.109) 
-0.140 
(0.248) 
0.127 
(0.313) 
 Year Effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
 State or Region Effects No No Yes Yes No 
 Individual Effects No No No No Yes 
 
Notes: Sample includes respondents with a high school degree or less.  Dependent variable is training incidence.  All regressions also include a linear term in age, dummy 
variables for blacks, Hispanics, females, less than high school, whether the respondent started a new job within the year, and a constant where applicable.  Regressions are 
weighted by the NLSY sampling weights.  Standard errors in columns (1) to (4) are adjusted for the presence of state*time or region*time and individual effects in the 
error term (see Appendix 2 for details). Standard errors in columns (5) are adjusted for the presence of region*time effects in the error term.  Number of observations is 
21652 in the unrestricted sample and 7032 in the low wage sample. 
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Table 7 
The Effect of Minimum Wage Increases on Affected Workers by Industry 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Industry in prior year is less competitive -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-- -- -- -- 
Industry wage differential in prior year -- -- -- -- -0.024 
(0.015) 
-0.025 
(0.015) 
-0.038 
(0.017) 
-0.030 
(0.016) 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year is below the 
current minimum wage 
0.005 
(0.016) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
-- -- -- 
Minimum increased and wage in prior year is below the 
current minimum and above prior year minimum 
 
-- 
0.008 
(0.023) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
-- -0.032 
(0.039) 
-- -- 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year is below 150 
% of the current minimum wage 
 
-- 
 
-- 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
 
-- 
-- -- -0.044 
(0.022) 
-- 
Minimum wage increased and wage in prior year is below 130 
% of the current minimum wage 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-- -- -- -0.021 
(0.035) 
Minimum increased and wage in prior year is below the 
current minimum wage*less competitive industry 
0.011 
(0.039) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is between current  and 
prior minimum*less competitive industry 
-- 0.036 
(0.039) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is below 150 % of the 
current minimum wage*less competitive industry 
-- -- 0.032 
(0.020) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is below 130 % of the 
current minimum wage*less competitive industry 
-- -- -- 0.004 
(0.024) 
-- -- -- -- 
Minimum increased and wage in prior year is below the 
current minimum wage*industry wage differential 
-- -- -- -- 0.036 
(0.073) 
-- -- -- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is between current  and 
prior minimum*industry wage differential 
-- -- -- -- -- 0.115 
(0.095) 
-- -- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is below 150 % of the 
current minimum wage*industry wage differential 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.102 
(0.045) 
-- 
Minimum increased and prior wage is below 130 % of the 
current minimum wage*industry wage differential 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.036 
(0.052) 
 
Notes: Non-mover sample, consisting of all workers with a high school education or less, who do not move between states  from one year to the next.  Dependent variable 
is the change in training incidence between two consecutive years.  All regressions also include a constant, the change in high school graduation status and new job status, 
and year dummies.  Regressions are weighted by NSLY sampling weights.  Standard errors are adjusted for the presence of individual effects in the error term, and 
therefore robust to the MA structure of the error.  Sample size is 17052. 
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